Pankaj Mishra - Prostitute

Cameron’s Cuz Is More The Curzon


Pankaj Mishra’s was more an ideological cry of pain than any honest appraisal of my book, says Patrick French

Patrick French


India is changing more rapidly now than at any point in its history. Change brings uncertainty. Even if you are doing well—better than your parents could ever have hoped for—many of the old certainties have disappeared. Jobs are less secure, even if better paid. School places are more difficult to obtain. Prices are unstable.

When I wrote India: A Portrait, I wanted to catch some of this uncertainty—the sense that the world was fluctuating. The voices of the very rich, the voices of the very poor and the voices of the many in between are part of a symbiotic story that extends from Ladakh to Kanyakumari. Because writing on India is so often riven by ideology, it was hard to do this in one book. For devotees of the India Shining story, at home and abroad, the rise of a new consumer market is in itself the story. For followers of the political left, prosperity must be discounted since it has increased inequality: why be happy for many millions of people who have been lifted out of poverty following the economic reforms of the early 1990s, if so many others have been left behind?

It should, in theory at least, be possible to write about contemporary India in a way that is neither triumphalist nor apocalyptic. By including a range of contradictory characters, I hoped to draw people out of their ideological comfort zones and look at aspects of the present and recent past directly, without preconceptions. In most cases, this has worked, and readers and reviewers have been generous in their reaction. A particularly tired message came from Pankaj Mishra in Outlook. As most readers will have realised, it was less a review than an ideological cry of pain. So I was depicted as a Bob Christo character, playing several villainous, alien roles: I was the viceroy Lord Curzon, a shocked “foreign visitor”, a writer influenced by “right-wing Friedmans”, whose book was aimed at “western businessmen”—and not just any western businessmen, but the sort who “remain indifferent to the benighted 800 million in rural areas”. Pankaj had, in fact, already written a review of the book in London’s blue-chip Financial Times which contained compliments like “eloquent” and “acclaimed”, but in the Outlook version, such words disappeared.

The technique he used was one of calculated distortion and misquotation, claiming, for instance, that my research into the family background of Lok Sabha MPs revealed what was already “blindingly plain...to any sentient Indian” (though presumably not plain to the Editor of Outlook, who put the story on the cover). Bizarrely, he misquoted me as saying, “Hindus have no concept of compassion.” But I never wrote this sentence, and nor do I believe it. For a reviewer, it is the cheapest shot in the locker to compare any foreigner you disagree with to a British imperialist. For the record, I am the first member of my family to go to the subcontinent. My grandparents came from Ireland—and the Irish did not rule India. Perhaps it is Pankaj, with his high, sanctimonious tone and his migratory bio (he apparently divides his time between Delhi, Shimla and London) who sounds more like the viceroy Lord Curzon.

For a reviewer, it’s the cheapest shot to compare a foreigner you disagree with to a British imperialist. My grandparents came from Ireland, and the Irish did not rule India.



I write as someone who has long admired Pankaj Mishra’s literary aspirations. I first met him in 1996, when he asked me to lunch at the Gaylord restaurant in Connaught Place so as to give me a copy of his Bill Bryson-style travel book Butter Chicken in Ludhiana. It was funny and entertaining, and remains his best book. His journalism has been interesting: no fellow writer could fail to be impressed by his rendition of the story of Ngodup, a Tibetan man who died in a protest in Delhi. It is a pity Pankaj did not pursue his burgeoning career as a novelist, or produce the promised short history of modern India. Instead, he has ranged widely, sitting on eminent literary prize committees, popping up as a visiting fellow at assorted foreign universities and jetting about denouncing “business-class lounges” and their elite inhabitants. It is not clear whether Pankaj—travelling the globe for high-paying western publications, while busily condemning “late capitalist society”—ever uses these lounges himself, or whether he prefers to take a downgrade to cattle class. For a long time I have appreciated his chutzpah most of all, though he remains a writer of promise. He has been successful in imparting his “authentic” take on India to the West, and one American intellectual even adjudged our reviewer to be “the young Siddhartha Gautama himself: a scholar-sophisticate” after meeting him at “the lower Manhattan holiday party of a stylish magazine”.

Pankaj has obviously been on a long journey from his self-described origins—in what he calls a “new, very poor and relatively inchoate Asian society”—to his present position at the heart of the British establishment, married to a cousin of the prime minister David Cameron. But he seems oddly resentful of the idea of social mobility for other Indians. One of the most unexpected aspects of my research for India: A Portrait was the sheer extent of aspiration and achievement across the country, ranging from a girl from a poor background who secured a place at an IIT, to a man who has devoted his life to inventing and manufacturing a low-cost sanitary towel, to Dattu, a landless and illiterate adivasi, who today has a good job in a Maharashtra winery, to C.K. Ranganathan, who trudged the streets of Cuddalore in the 1980s selling sachets of shampoo and now employs more than 1,000 people. Pankaj looks down haughtily on the Re 1 sachet revolution, saying “cheap beauty aids are unlikely to compensate the poor for a cruelly inegalitarian healthcare system”. But whoever suggested they would? It is a fatuous conjunction of two unrelated points.

Having read his review, it is still not clear to me what he wants for India. He mentions what is wrong: poverty, corruption, debt, resource shortages, poor primary education and healthcare. But everyone knows this. Much of my book is devoted to analysing the ways in which progress is—and is not—being made. And the question remains—how to proceed from here? I do not buy the romantic view that an end to poverty is possible without the creation of wealth, or that the era of the permit raj was somehow an easier time. “India registered its most impressive gains from 1951 to 1980,” Pankaj wrote in one of his blogs on the Guardian website. “Until 1980, India achieved an average annual economic growth of 3.5 per cent”. This is a ludicrous statistic to quote, since it makes no mention that the population grew rapidly during the same period: by the 1970s, per capita GDP in India was rising more slowly than at any point in the preceding century. In another exhausting blog post, he makes a paternalistic plea to the British government not to cut its foreign aid, so as to avoid “the severing of Britain’s old links with India’s great mass of ordinary people”. But with the British economy contracting and cousin Cameron having to borrow money to fulfil that particular obligation, it hardly looks like a long-term solution.

It goes without saying that I do not believe—as alleged—that “consumer capitalism is the summit of human civilisation”, but I also have grave doubts whether Marxism, Maoism or Mishraism offer a solution. Can India’s chronic rural poverty really be alleviated only by the state? If so, how will the state get the money to do this, except by further economic growth? It is no use chanting “garibi hatao” and patting yourself on the back if you have no coherent suggestions of how to abolish poverty. You do not choose your history or your geography, and India is situated in a dangerous and difficult neighbourhood. It may be a long way from Utopia, but India has an entrenched and developed democratic system, a long tradition of fervent debate, a vibrant economy and a largely tolerant relationship between different communities.

I have some questions for the vendors of the apocalypse, who make a living abroad selling a constrained, outdated and implacably narrow vision of what India is and could be. Where do they currently see their own political and economic ideas being put into effect in a useful, humane way? Is it in West Bengal, or Dantewada? Or perhaps abroad, in foreign countries? How does poverty stand a chance of being alleviated unless someone does the work of creating wealth? How is the state to pay for social welfare schemes and come up with money if not through taxing the wealth that is generated by individuals and by industry?

I ask this in a spirit of genuine inquiry, because it seems that the Indian Left has failed utterly to come up with a coherent narrative with which to oppose economic liberalisation. It is easy enough to identify problems (which invariably predate the reforms of the early 1990s) but what are missing are active, detailed, constructive, alternative proposals. It is simple to recite the problems, and nobody disputes their depth or seriousness. If Pankaj or his admirers e-mail me with their ideas (patrick@theindiasite.com), the most interesting responses will be put up on www.theindiasite.com. Rough, raw, real life does not fit in with any ideology, leftist or rightist—that is the message of my book.

A note to readers: Do share your ideas not only with Mr French but also in your letters to the editor on this website -- Web Ed.

NGOs in Haiti: "The Handmaidens of Imperial Domination"

NGOs in Haiti: "The Handmaidens of Imperial Domination"

An Interview With Ashley Smith

By Mike Whitney

January 26, 2010 "Information Clearing House" -- MW--In your article in CounterPunch titled "Haiti and the Aid Racket", you said that "The catastrophe in Haiti has revealed the worst aspects of the U.S. government and the NGO aid industry". Can you explain what you mean?

Ashley Smith---After the earthquake, the imperial powers and international NGOs collected billions of dollars with the promise that they would provide relief for Haiti's quake victims and then rebuild the country. Today, even mainstream figures are profoundly critical of what the U.S. and the NGOs have done. For example, Ricardo Seitenfus, the special representative from the Organization of American States (OAS) to Haiti, told the Swiss daily Le Temps, "If there is failure of international aid, it is Haiti."

For that moment of honesty, the OAS fired Seitenfus. But he was right. Today, there are still over 810,000 people, essentially quake refugees, trapped in 1,150 tent camps in and around Port-au-Prince. Only 15 percent of the promised transitional housing has been built. Astonishingly only 5 percent of the rubble has been removed. And there has been next to no reconstruction.

The U.S. is principally to blame for this failure. Initially the Obama Administration used the cover of humanitarianism to deploy 20,000 troops and 17 naval ships to bolster the UN occupation in policing desperate people and preventing an exodus of refugees. This military response, as Doctors without Borders complained at the time, actually interfered with the distribution of humanitarian aid. Once it did turn to relief and reconstruction, it set up the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) under its control, which garnered promises of $10 billion in donations from the imperial powers. The IHRC, however, has only collected 10 percent of the promised sums. When and if they do collect the donations, the U.S. aims to implement a neoliberal plan of to exploit Haiti's cheap labor in sweatshops, export-oriented plantations, and tourist resorts. So what they claim to be an effort, in IHRC co-chair Bill Clinton's words, an "effort to build back better" is actually a ruse for the exploitation of Haiti.

The international NGOs' record is almost as abysmal. To be clear, some have done invaluable work, especially Partners in Health. But on the whole, the NGOs have failed the Haitian people. The NGOs have not spent the enormous sums of money they collected. The Red Cross, for instance, garnered $479 million in donations for Haiti, but has only spent or committed $245 million to projects. The NGOs do not coordinate their relief efforts. They are engaged in capitalist competition with one another for funds and are pre-occupied with branding their separate efforts so that they can advertise their "successes" to their donors. As a result, the NGOs provide at best provide a chaotic jumble of services to quake victims. At worst, they are sitting on piles of cash.

In truth, the U.S., its allies, and NGO surrogates have overseen and in many cases caused worsening conditions in Haiti worse over the last year. The failure of reconstruction left hundreds of thousands trapped in camps, vulnerable to storms, disease, and violence brought on by desperate conditions. On top of that, the UN occupation forces, specifically a contingent of Nepalese soldiers, most likely introduced cholera that has now become a countrywide epidemic, killing thousands and infecting hundreds of thousands more. The U.S. then precipitated a political crisis by pushing for parliamentary election to give a democratic veneer to American neocolonial rule. The election was a sham; it excluded the country's most popular political party, Fanmi Lavalas, and was marred by massive fraud and a contested outcome. Finally, like a nightmare, the former dictator, "Baby Doc" Duvalier, has returned to the country from exile, throwing the country into political chaos.

MW---Professor David Harvey says that NGOs act as "Trojan horses for neoliberal globalization." Do you agree with Harvey and, if so, would you elaborate?

Ashley Smith---Let's be clear first that NGOs form a big range of groups, from reformist organizations to large international humanitarians ones and others that are essentially appendages of various state powers, both major and minor. Some reformist NGOs have played a significant role in the World Social Forum and others are clearly on the side of neoliberal globalization. Harvey is absolutely correct about the role of the international NGOs. There is an insidious relationship between them, U.S. imperialism and neoliberal globalization.

After the economic crisis of the 1970s, the U.S. abandoned Keynesianism, whose emphasis on state-led development had failed, and adopted market fundamentalism, aka neoliberalism, at home and abroad to restore profits and growth in the system. In the U.S. the ruling class busted unions, cut the welfare state, and deregulated the economy. Internationally, as Walden Bello documents in Dark Victory, the U.S. used the debt crisis to compel third world countries to open up their markets, abolish regulations on foreign and domestic capital, privatize state industry, and shred state-run social programs.

Neoliberalism worked for the capitalist class, restoring profit and growth—however uneven—in the world system. But neoliberalism exacted an enormous social price everywhere. In the third world, it dislocated peasants, impoverished workers, and created enormous slums in many parts of the world. On top of that, the hollowing out of the states left many countries unable to provide services, regulate capital, or respond to natural and social crises.

The imperial powers, International Financial Institutions, and corporate foundations diverted their money from third world states to NGOs to fill the vacuum. In this way, the NGOs have actually accelerated the opening up of third world economies. In an apt phrase, David Harvey calls the process "privatization by NGO."

MW---Do the big NGOs see natural disasters as a "growth industry" or is their interest strictly humanitarian?

Ashley Smith---In reality the answer is both. They are part and parcel of what Naomi Klein has called disaster capitalism. International NGOs are really businesses and big ones at that. There are about 50,000 international NGOs that compete for about $10 billion in funding from the International Financial Institutions, the imperial powers, and local governments. Just like corporations, they have chief executive officers, boards made up of mainly capitalists, a middle class professional staff, and then down at the bottom poorly paid laborers in their countries of operation.

These NGOs raise their funds by highlighting problems in the third world especially catastrophes like the earthquake in Haiti, branding their relief projects, and then advertising their efforts to imperial, corporate, and individual donors to raise more money. They are in the business of poverty and disaster management. A couple of people in the international NGOs actually told me that when the earthquake struck in Haiti some NGO bureaucrats, excited with the new prospects of fundraising, celebrated the disaster as if they had struck oil.

As capitalist entities they affirm and exacerbate the class division in the societies in which they operate. Anthropologist Mark Schuller describes their impact in Haiti. He writes: "In addition to higher salaries, NGO employees have access to many privileges: clean drinking water, electricity to charge cell phones, e-mail and the ever-prized U.S. visa. These privileges in turn plug individuals into the global economy. People's first visits to the U.S. solidified neoliberal ideologies. This artificial, dependent middle class--the "NGO class"--thus directly support a form of economic globalization, accomplishes ideological work and further stratifies the Haitian population, selecting a chosen few for privileges denied Haiti's poor majority."

For all their professed humanitarianism, these NGOs in no way solve the ongoing crisis and at best mitigate the disaster in societies where they operate. Since they are inter-twined with neoliberal capitalism, they cannot and will not challenge the systemic roots of third world poverty that turn natural disasters into social catastrophes. They are in fact complicit with the problem. Thus, they do a booming business putting band-aids on the mortal wounds their neoliberal donors inflict. Haiti is the paradigmatic example. As Haiti spirals into greater poverty NGOs have exploded to over 10,000 across the country. The worse the conditions have gotten, the more NGOs have sprouted up, in a cycle of growing needs ever more inadequately met.

MW---Why has it been so hard to make progress in addressing the basic needs of the Haitian people? Is it a question of funding, logistics, access to heavy equipment, politics or something else?

Ashley Smith----It is really not a technical or logistics problem at all. Nor is it a problem with the Haitian people, as racists often argue. As Alex Dupuy documents in his brilliant book, Haiti and the World Economy, the fault of the Haitian underdevelopment lies with the Haitian ruling class and imperialism. After the Haitian Revolution in 1804—the first successful slave revolution in history—the new Haitian ruling class tried to maintain plantation farming for export to the world market. But the freed slaves fled the plantations to become peasants farming for subsistence and small-scale export. Unable to sustain their capitalist plantations let alone industrialize the society, the ruling class split into two parts—urban merchants and rural land barons, both parasitic on the domestic peasant majority and dependent on international capitalism.

Imperialism, however, was and is the central cause of Haiti's underdevelopment. The imperial powers—all slaveholders at the time—were terrified by the threat of the Haitian Revolution. They initially imposed an economic embargo on the fledgling society and then trapped Haiti in debt. In return for recognition of the country in 1825, France forced Haiti to pay 150 million francs, the equivalent today of $21 billion, in compensation for the loss of its slaves. Thus France structurally adjusted Haiti at its birth. As the rising imperial power in the region, the U.S. developed a predatory relationship to Haiti, invading and occupying several times at the end of the 19th century to ensure debt repayments. It occupied the country from 1915 to 1934, repressing the population and setting up the dreaded Haitian Armed Forces. Later it backed the Duvalier family dictatorship as an anticommunist ally against Castro in Cuba.

At the end of the 1970s, the U.S. convinced Baby Doc to implement a neoliberal plan to open up Haiti to American agribusiness, build sweatshops for the multinational textile industry, and set up swank tourist resorts for yuppies. Impoverished and fed up, the Haitian peasants, workers and urban poor rose up in the mass movement, Lavalas, that drove Baby Doc from power and then elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide President in 1990 on a program of social reform. The U.S. responded by backing the Haitian ruling class in two coups, one in 1991 and another in 2004. Their aim was to repress the mass movement and block the attempt to use the Haitian state to improve conditions for the country's masses. Since 2004, it has maintained a UN occupation in the country to police resistance, while it has tried to impose the same old economic plan.

MW---Author Mike Davis says that NGOs are a form of "soft imperialism." If he's right, then the work of the thousands of NGOs in Haiti could be seen as a form of occupation? Your thoughts?

Ashley Smith---He's absolutely right about the international NGOs. In the past, imperialism used religious institutions as a means to justify conquest, colonization and plunder as a civilizing mission—they were bringing the light of Christianity to the heathen masses. Today while the imperial powers plunder the third world, they funnel money into NGOs to make it seem like they are interested in aiding the very people they are robbing and exploiting. Haiti is perhaps the worst example of this process. While the U.S. imposed neoliberal plans that impoverished the people, it poured money into NGOs, cultivating the self-congratulatory illusion that it is helping Haiti.

Just like the religious institutions of the past, the NGOs are part and parcel of imperial domination of third world countries. In Haiti, for example, 70 percent of the NGO funding comes from the U.S. state. As a result, they become vehicles for control through provision of the societies in which they operate. As Peter Hallward argues, "the bulk of USAID money that goes to Haiti and to other countries in the region is explicitly designed to pursue interests--the promotion of a secure investment climate, the nurturing of links with local business elites, the preservation of a docile and low-wage labor force, and so on."

Perhaps one of the worst impacts of the NGOs is how they have become a vehicle for the cooptation of the indigenous resistance. As Mike Davis puts it in Planet of Slums, "Third World NGOs have proven brilliant at co-opting local leadership as well as hegemonizing the social space traditionally occupied by the Left. Even if there are some celebrated exceptions—such as the militant NGOs so instrumental in creating the World Social Forums—the broad impact of the NGO/'civil society revolution"…has been to bureaucratize and de-radicalize urban social movements."

MW---To what extent are NGOs being used to usurp the power of the state? Do they pose a direct threat to Haiti's sovereignty?

Ashley Smith---This is the most insidious face of the imperial use of NGOs in Haiti. As I noted earlier, even before the earthquake, imperial and corporate donors were bypassing the Haitian state to give money directly to international NGOs. They thus exacerbated the gutting of the Haitian state so much so that Haitians now refer to their own country as ruled not by their own government but by a "Republic of NGOs."

That phrase captures how Haiti has lost its sovereignty. But the reality is even worse than the phrase implies. The NGOs are not part of any republic; they are not democratically accountable to the Haitian people or even its government, but to international donors. And they are not truly non-governmental. They are in fact so dependent on imperial powers for their donations that they are better thought of as subsidiaries of those governments.

In reality, the NGOs are part of how U.S. imperialism rules Haiti today as a neocolony. It uses the UN occupation force as its repressive arm. And it uses NGOs to oversee social services. The combination of the UN and the NGOs undercut any notion that the Haitian state let alone its people control their own country.

MW---What is the relationship between the Pentagon and the NGOs?

Ashley Smith----Historically, NGOs had an established doctrine of neutrality in conflicts and refused to endorse imperial intervention. However, as Conor Foley documents in The Thin Blue Line: How Humanitarianism Went to War, many of the big NGOs like Doctors Without Borders have abandoned that stance and call for imperial intervention. They are thus handmaidens of imperial domination.

In Haiti, the U.S. deliberately used willing NGOs as allies in their destabilization and eventual overthrow of the Aristide government. The U.S. imposed an aid embargo to prevent Aristide from implementing any social reforms. They then channeled money through USAID into NGOs. Many of these NGOs would line up with the ruling class opposition, the Group of 184, some even backed the U.S.-backed death squads, and others supported the U.S. coup.

Today, Haiti is a neocolony of the United States. The U.S. has effective state power through the UN occupation. It controls its economy through IHRC. It dominates almost every aspect of civil society through its NGO raj. For all these reasons former OAS representative Ricardo Seitenfus said the UN was "transforming the Haitians into prisoners on their own island."

Ashley Smith writes for the Socialist Worker. He can be reached at: ashley05401@yahoo.com

Mike Whitney lives in Washington state and can be reached at fergiewhitney@msn.com

Panditji is no more; a light goes out.

Sindh's Stolen Brides

On the other side of the Thar, Hindus, especially girls, are forced into Islam

Mariana Baabar
Outlook

January 23, 2006



Pakistan's minorities record is truly appalling. Sadly, Musharraf is doing nothing to right it.
Amir Mir

Hindus In Pakistan

• Hindus constitute about 2.5 per cent, or 26 lakh, of Pakistan's population.
• Though sprinkled all over Pakistan, 95 per cent of Hindus are in Sindh.
• Only Tharparkar district in Sindh has Hindus in majority: 51 per cent.
• Other districts with sizeable population: Mirpur Khas (41 per cent), Sanghar (35 per cent), Umerkot (43 per cent)
• Nearly 82 per cent of Pakistani Hindus are lower caste, most of them farm labourers
• Cities with some Hindu population: Karachi, Hyderabad, Jacobabad, Lahore, Peshawar and Quetta.
• In Tharparkar, Hindus own land. Krishen Bheel, Gyan Chand and Ramesh Lal are the Hindus in the Pakistan National Assembly.

Let me confess at the outset: I'm travelling in interior Sindh to verify specifically the reported widespread menace of abduction of Hindu girls, their forcible conversion to Islam and betrothal to Muslim men. My first port of call is the district court of Mirpur Khas. I promptly mingle among the crowd waiting for the court's decision on a kidnap-and-conversion case. Different voices narrate contradictory stories. I am befuddled for the moment.

Soon, a frisson of excitement sweeps through the throng, as a police van drives through the gate. Inside it is Mariam. She's 13 years old—and married! Mariam was Mashu, and Hindu, till the night of December 22, 2005. I pick my way through the jostling crowd. Mariam is in a red burqa, her gold nose ring sparkles. She tells me, "I'm happy. I don't want to return to my parents or brother." What's the fuss about, I wonder.

It's quite another story under the pipal tree of the court compound. Huddled under it are the villagers of Jhaluree, 20 km from Mirpur Khas. Among them is Mashu's father, Malo Sanafravo. He says that at 11 pm, December 22, four armed men barged into their room. One of them was Malo's neighbour, Akbar. They picked up Mashu, bundled her into the waiting car. "She was taken to Pir Ayub Jan Sarhandi's village in Somarho tehsil." There Mashu became Mariam and was married to Akbar.

Not true, insists husband Akbar. "Mariam has been always in my heart," he gushes, saying, at 11 pm, December 22, it was she who had come over to his house. But it's true that the Pir converted her and married them—it was his idea that they issue statements in the court. "Mariam was sent to Darul Aman in Hyderabad, in judicial custody," Akbar declares.

A 13-year-old choosing to convert and marry? A 13-year-old testifying in the court, without her family by her side? Suspicious, I walk over to the SHO, caught in the middle of a heated exchange between two groups. Someone suggests he should allow the girl to meet her relatives. Before the conversion yes, not now. She has now become Muslim, says the SHO. He argues, "There's a huge crowd here. If Mariam breaks down after seeing her father, there will be a communal riot here in the compound."

A little later, there are celebrations as the word spreads: the court has allowed the couple to live together. Standing next to me is Kanjee Rano Bheel. He works for an NGO in the education sector; volunteers for the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) as well.

"In just two hours Mashu was converted and married," Kanjee says incredulously. Disappointment and helpless rage fleet across his face. "In Darul Aman the girls are kept away from parents and pressured into issuing statements favourable to the abductors. They tame stubborn girls through death threats."

So, was Mashu abducted and forcibly converted?

In Mirpur Khas, truth resembles the mirage of the surrounding Thar desert, teasing and tormenting me as I drive from Karachi into interior Sindh. It tests your credulity, it challenges your journalistic skills. Wherever I go, and whoever I meet, in disconsolate voices the Hindus talk about 'missing girls'; their stories resemble Mashu's—the theme of abduction, conversion, often followed by marriage, is common to most narrations. The girls then appear in courts to issue statements declaring their conversion was voluntary. All links to the natal family and the community are severed; they are lost to the family forever. On January 4, 2005, Marvi, 18, and Hemi, 16, were kidnapped from Kunri village in Umerkot district; three months later, on March 3, 14-year-old Raji was abducted from Aslam Town Jhuddo, Mirpur Khas. The script in their cases was similar to Mashu's. "Only 10 per cent of all conversions involving girls are voluntary; because of romance," says Kanjee.

Ten per cent of what? No official figures are available. The DIG in Mirpur Khas, Saleemullah, says, "If there's need I'll collect these figures. Minorities are the safest in Pakistan."

Members of the Hindu Bheel community show photos of girls who they say have been kidnapped and converted

Saleemullah, perhaps, should tap the HRCP for statistics. Its director in Lahore, I.A. Rehman, is an honourable man. Rehman told Outlook that the HRCP has, between Jan 2000 to Dec 2005, documented 50 cases involving conversion of Hindu girls to Islam. Its investigations too endorse what I had found in interior Sindh. In many cases where it was claimed the girls had eloped with their Muslim partners, the HRCP found that most were, in fact, abducted, forcibly married to Muslim men or sold to them. There have been cases of Hindu girls, usually from economically better off families, eloping with their Muslim boyfriends. Rehman says in most cases such marriages didn't last long. With links to their families cut off, the girls were subsequently forced to marry another Muslim or sucked into marriage rackets.

Nuzzhat Shirin, who works for the Lahore-based ngp Aurat Foundation, understands why the girls don't reveal their plight at the time they are presented in court. "When a Hindu is forced to become Muslim, such a ruckus is made that if the young kidnapped girl appears in court, the fanatics yell, scream, throw rose petals in the air and follow the youth into the building so that she's intimidated and can't speak," Shirin explains.

Social stigma arising from the loss of virginity, and the consequent difficulty of finding a groom, prompt these women to accept their misfortune—and hope for the best.

Fifty incidents in five years represents just a percentage of the total number of cases, says Kanjee, pointing out that a majority of such crimes go unreported. "There have been 50 such incidents last year," insists Krishen Bheel, who is a Hindu member of the National Assembly (MNA), the Pakistani equivalent of the Lok Sabha. He begins to rattle out the cases he remembers: two months back Sapna was kidnapped and converted in upper Sindh; seven months earlier it was 17-year-old Lakshmi in Nawkot, and then.... "The trend is increasing," he says. "If these conversions are voluntary, then how come boys rarely ever convert?"


Hindu women in Somarho who have been converted to Islam by Pir Ayub Jan Sirhandi

Only once did the popular resentment against abduction spill out in the streets of Mirpur Khas. It was in the '80s: a girl named Sita had been kidnapped. Some 70,000 Hindus turned up to protest the kidnapping. The police opened fire, killing several. "Sita was never returned," Krishen laments. "She had even told Justice Dhorab Patel, who later joined the HRCP, that she had been forcibly converted. We have now stopped agitating."

Instead, the Hindus take the support of civil rights groups and the media to publicise abduction cases, hoping public scrutiny would goad the state into action.

On Dec 30, the day after the Mariam case was disposed, the Supreme Court took cognisance of the complaint Qosheela's parents from Ghotki, Sindh, had filed. They claimed their 13-year-old girl had been kidnapped, converted, given the name of Hajra and married to a Muslim man. The girl, as in most other cases, had said she had converted of her own free will. A three-member bench, headed by Chief Justice Iftiqar Muhammad Chaudhry, ordered the medical examination of the girl to determine whether she had attained puberty (Islam permits marriage at that age). Should it be proved otherwise, the husband could be tried for rape.

Even cities are not immune to the menace. Last year, Sammo Amra and Champa in Karachi received a letter from their three missing daughters—Reena (21), Reema (17) and Usha (19)—informing that they had converted to Islam and were ordained under the dictates of their new religion not to live with infidels, including their Hindu parents. The letter bore the address of Madrassa Taleemul Islam, Karachi. It prompted Supreme Court Bar Association president Malik Mohammad Qayyum to petition the Supreme Court in the first week of December. He accused the religious seminary's administrator of using coercive methods to convert the three girls. On December 16, the court ordered the police to shift the girls to the Edhi Welfare Centre and provide protection to them until the time it was ascertained they had been indeed compelled to convert to Islam.

Sensitive Muslim citizens feel the way to counter the menace is to reinterpret and widen the scope of law.

Major (retd) Kamran Shafi, an absentee landlord from Sindh, cites the case of 17-year-old Kochlia, who was kidnapped and gangraped in Jacobabad, Sindh, in Sept 2005. Four men were arrested for the crime. They were subsequently released because Kochlia stated in the court she had converted and was married to one of them. Shafi asks, "Isn't something very, very wrong here? Suppose the poor girl was forced into changing her religion and marrying one of the assailants so that they get off the hook? Can't the state prosecute the four on its own, for their original crime of rape?"

The three Hindu MNAs—Krishen Bheel, Gyan Chand and Ramesh Lal—raised the Kochlia case in the National Assembly. They claimed Kochlia's statement was not tenable as under the local Hindu custom and law a girl can't marry of her own will until the age of 20. Since Kochlia is a minor, her abductors should be tried for rape. Such an interpretation of existing laws could provide ample relief to Hindus.

Till then, though, the fear of kidnap stalks the Hindus of Pakistan. Krishen Bheel says Hindu girls are scared to go out; he has enrolled his own children into a Christian school. He points to Mirpur Khas' strange predicament: there's freedom to worship, there are 10 temples which bustle through the day with devotees; and yet Hindu girls here are kidnapped and converted—and the community humiliated.

Perhaps these abductions are part of the general scenario of crime against women in rural Pakistan (see box). Perhaps they are converted and married to criminals to enable the latter to escape the dragnet of the law. Yet, such arguments don't comfort the Hindus. Sat Ram, of Shadi Bali village near Mirpur Khas, says Hindu girls are deprived of education because their parents are apprehensive of sending them to schools located at a distance. "They receive education only till the primary level. It isn't safe to send them to school after that."

But the plight of Hindu women can't be seen just through the prism of gender discrimination rampant in rural Sindh. Reena Gul, of Sattar Nagar village, Mirpur Khas, says the boys too are converted but their numbers are very few. The community here feels it is the Islamist's agenda to drive out non-Muslims from Pakistan. In fact, Krishen told the National Assembly that even Hindu businessmen are being kidnapped in Sindh for ransom. He said on the floor of the House, "Several religious parties are reportedly behind the move to convince the people that it is their responsibility to get rid of infidels from Pakistan, (that) taking ransom from non-Muslims is not a sin."

I now set out to meet Pir Ayub Jan Sarhandi, whose name surfaces repeatedly in conversion stories. The drive from Mirpur Khas to Sarhandi village, Somarho tehsil, is through a picturesque landscape. Peacocks dance in the field and gypsies pitch their tents for the night. Even the Pir appears tranquil, his white flowing beard and winsome disposition camouflaging his mission.

Yet, when he begins to talk, he conceals nothing. Yes, the Pir declares, he has been converting the Hindus for the last 30 years. Perhaps his claims of converting a 1,000 families a year is a boast. "There's a surah in the Quran which speaks specifically about conversion, especially about conversion of women," he says to justify his mission. "Recently, three Hindu girls were brought to me. I named them Benazir, Sanam and Nusrat," he reveals, with the righteous air of someone who had bestowed a favour. "These Hindu women are mistreated by their husbands who do nothing but watch TV."

The Pir rubbishes the allegation that he converts abducted Hindu girls. The unwilling are sent back. Yet, he adds in the same breath, "In many cases Hindu girls are kidnapped and kept as keeps. But these keeps are not converted. But believe me, they are very happy."

I express the desire to meet the women whom he had converted and found sanctuary with him. The Pir agrees, even allows us to photograph them, contrary to the local tradition. Into the room, the women walk. Rehana, 50, was earlier Nabee; she converted three years ago, after the death of her husband. "I had no one to turn to. If we do not convert we would not be helped by this family." It was the same reason for 35-year-old Mariam, who came here seven years back. "Under the Pir's protection, I earn at least Rs 200 a month." Ruksana was earlier Chotee, and hails from Umerkot. Extreme poverty and a drug-addict husband persuaded her to take the extreme step. "I brought my four kids as well," she declares.

As I talk to these women, I realise most of them are widows or wallowing in poverty. I mention this to the Pir. He says, "The government is responsible for all Hindus and non-Hindus. When the government doesn't help them, they come to us."

Forced or economically enticed, the Hindu converts do not symbolise Islam's appeal. Rather they represent the state's failure to provide succour to the poor and protect their religious rights. Perhaps it's also symptomatic of the sickness afflicting the Pakistani state. As they say, the condition of the minorities is an indicator of a nation's health.

By Mariana Baabar in interior Sindh with Amir Mir in Lahore

Kidnapping and Forceful Conversion of Hindu Young Men During the Muslim Rule in India

Dr Radhasyam Brahmachari

A Muslim lady, called Nusrat Jahan Ayesha Siddiqa, has written a book in Bengali and titled “Islamic Peace and Massacring the Infidels”, and she has given a nice description of the events, in the preface of that book – how the Muslim kings and nobles used to hijack best Hindu young men, convert them to Islam and give their daughters in marriage to them. The book has been published by another Muslim lady called Laila Anjumand Ara Banu. The paragraphs below present a translation of Preface of the book by the authoress (as quoted by R N Datta in his book “The Silent Terror”).

“Many Hindus of Bengal are aware of the Hindu kingdom and the Hindu kings of Ektakia, in the district of Rajshahi, now in Bangladesh. Saptadurga or Satgarah was their capital. When Syed Hussain Shah was the Badshah of Bengal, having capital at Gaur, now situated in the district of Maldah in West Bengal, Raja Madan Narayan, a Brahmin, was the king of Ektakia. These Hindu kingdoms like Ektakia were not independent but tributaries to the Badshah of Bengal and had to pay annual tax or revenue to the Badshah of Gaur. In one occasion, King Madan Narayan took his two sons Kandarpa Narayan and Kamdeb Narayan with him during his annual visit to Gaur for paying his tribute.

Syed Hussain Shah had many daughters out of his four wives. Being a Sayed, the Badshah used to look down upon the other Muslims who were converted to Islam from Hinduism or Buddhism. So, several of his daughters, though grown up, were remained unwed for want of suitable grooms. But the two charming, educated, intelligent, young and chaste sons of Madan Narayan instantly attracted the attention of Hussain Shah, who decided to marry his two eldest daughters to them. When the Badshah disclosed his mind to Madan Narayan, he told the Badshah with folded hands, said, “O King! You are my Lord and hence you should not play a tyrant to me as it does not look nice and befitting for you.” But the Badshah very cleverly replied, “O dear King, you should not misunderstand me. I personally have much respect and love for the kings of Ektakia. I, being a Syed, is the guru of the Muslims, as you, a Brahmin, is to the Hindus. As your daughters cannot marry anyone except he is a Brahmin, similarly my daughters cannot marry ordinary Muslims. I want to give the hands of my daughters to your sons in marriage, not as a tyrant, but as respect and deep regards for your illustrious family. I do not say that, your sons will have to embrace Islam. It is a natural and common social rule that the wife must follow the religion of her husband and hence you are at liberty to convert my daughters to Hinduism before marriage. If you do not agree, then I should say that your sons have to be converted to Islam. And we shall be glad to include them into our community. Out of these two proposals, I shall follow which you will consider best, but I shall never apply force in any circumstances.”

King Madan Narayan could smell that, the Badshah would show his real face if he disagreed both the proposal. Secondly, being a devout Brahmin, it would not be possible for him to bring a girl from a Muslim family, though after a possible conversion to Hinduism. So, he gave up the hope of his sons and consequently they were converted to Islam and married to the daughters of Hussain Shah. Later on, he kidnapped 11 more young men of the family of Madan Narayan, including his sons and nephews, converted them to Islam and married them with 11 princesses of his family. Only one boy, Ratikanta, the fourth son of Madan Narayan was spared because of his poor eye sight. “Let the fellow with bad eye sight remain a Hindu and for the others with good eye sight, it has been better for them to convert to Islam”, said the Badshah ironically to Madan Narayan in on one occasion. In this way, 20 Hindu princes were hijacked from the Royal family of Ektakia.

This process of hijacking Hindu young men and giving them Muslim Royal princesses in marriage, of course after converting to Islam, was not confined to the Badshah of Bengal only. Even Mughal Emperors, in several occasions, adopted this policy to find suitable grooms for their princesses. Emperor Akbar married two of her daughters using this policy; one to the Music maestro, who was called Tansen after conversion to Islam, and the other daughter to Chandra Narayan, a Prince of the Royal family pf Ektakia. Aurangzeb married his eldest daughter to a Kashmiri Pundit called Krishna Narayan, after kidnapping and converting to Islam. When Sayesta Khan was the subedar of Bengal, Aurangzeb wrote him a letter asking him to kidnap suitable princes of the Royal family of Ektakia and convert to Islam and send them to Delhi under strong protection of the security staff. The above order also carried a strict instruction that said that, no such converted Hindu prince should be sent to Delhi; until he turns into a devout Muslim because the Emperor disliked meeting a converted Muslim who still possessed the hateful habits of the Hindu kafirs.

We used to listen to these stories from my grandmother. She also told us that we were the descendants of Prince Kandarpa Narayan. Though Prince Kamdeb could have been able to accept his conversion to Islam as his destiny, but Kandarpa Narayan could not. He could never become a Muslim by his heart. As there was no other alternative but to accept it as his fate, he ordered his descendants to carry the remembrance of their Hindu root from generation after generation. I belong to the 23rd generation of Prince Kandarpa Narayan and my blood begins to boil when I remember the Humiliation, coercion and torture that compelled my fore-fathers to convert to Islam.”

Remembering Vimal Patak

This Bangladeshi Hindu was caught in the street. He was brought to the mosque and was beaten to death. His pleads for mercy had no effect on the stone-hard hearts of the Muslim Satan worshippers. They chanted, "kill the kafir, kill the kafir" and shouted Allah u Akbar while Vimal Patak met his agonizing death.

What Terrorizes India?

WSJ
DECEMBER 20, 2010

By SADANAND DHUME

Is Hindu radicalism a bigger threat to India than the Lashkar-e-Taiba? Yes, if you are to believe Rahul Gandhi, the ruling Congress Party's 40-year-old general secretary, widely regarded as India's prime minister in waiting. According to a cable released last week by WikiLeaks, Mr. Gandhi had this to say last year in response to a question U.S. Ambassador to India Timothy Roemer posed about the Pakistan-based transnational terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba—responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks: "The bigger threat may be the growth of radicalized Hindu groups, which create religious tensions and political confrontations with the Muslim community."

Predictably enough, Mr. Gandhi's comment has ignited a firestorm of protest. Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi of the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party, a man not best known for his subtlety, accused Mr. Gandhi of giving "inspiration" to the United States's alleged pro-Pakistan tilt. To his credit, departing from his party's initial instinct to dismiss the leaked cable as part of a conspiracy, Mr. Gandhi did not disavow his comments. Instead, his party issued a clarification stating that in Mr. Gandhi's view "terrorism and communalism of all types are a threat to India."

This anodyne formulation does little to reassure those who believe that when it comes to radical Islam, Mr. Gandhi and his party are at best dangerously naïve and at worst calculatingly cynical. Taken together with earlier remarks by Mr. Gandhi and senior Congress Party leaders, the comment to Mr. Roemer is part of a disturbing pattern. In October, Mr. Gandhi likened another terrorist group, the banned Students Islamic Movement of India, to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (National Volunteer Corps), a grassroots Hindu-nationalist organization that provides the opposition BJP with many of its foot soldiers, and much of its ideology and leadership.

Another senior Congress leader, Digvijay Singh, has repeatedly pandered to the most conspiracy-minded elements of India's 140-million strong Muslim population. Earlier this month, Mr. Singh hinted that Hemant Karkare, a top policeman shot by Lashkar-e-Taiba militants during the Mumbai attacks, may have been killed by militant Hindus upset by his investigation into bomb blasts ascribed to them. Mr. Singh has also questioned the official account of a 2008 terrorist shootout in New Delhi that claimed the life of a highly decorated policeman.

Two years ago, he backed the assertion of another Congress leader, Abdul Rehman Antulay, that terrorists "had no reason to kill Karkare." Another leaked U.S. embassy cable from the time described Mr. Antulay's statement as "outlandish": evidence that the Congress "will readily stoop to the old caste/religious-based politics if it feels it is in its interest."

To concur with this view is not to sympathize with Hindu nationalism. Indeed, at a superficial level radical Islam and Hindu nationalism have much in common. Both represent a kind of religious tribalism marked by a sense of victimhood and deep suspicion of outsiders. Both radical Islamists and Hindu nationalists are prone to wild conspiracy theories—that the 9/11 terrorist attacks were planned by the U.S. government, or that Mr. Gandhi, whose mother, Congress President Sonia Gandhi, is Italian by birth, represents a secret Vatican plot to take over India. Both share a deep fascination with Western technology, and an aversion to Western culture. Both place group identity above individual rights.

But the similarities end there. Simply put, the notion that the radical Hindu threat to India is comparable to that posed by radical Islam is ludicrous. First there's the question of scale. Alleged Hindu terrorists—not one of whom has been convicted—are accused of bomb blasts in 2007 and 2008 in Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan and Maharashtra that killed 17 people. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, the toll in India from about two dozen radical Islamic terrorist attacks since 9/11 stands at more than 950 dead and many hundreds more injured.

The principal Hindu groups accused of the bombings—Abhinav Bharat and the Hindu Janajagruti Samiti—are ramshackle outfits with few members and scant popular support. The Lashkar-e-Taiba, by contrast, is part of a powerful international network and has close links with both al Qaeda and Pakistan's notorious military intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence. Despite international pressure following the group's 2001 assault on India's parliament and the Mumbai attacks, Islamabad has been loath to move against Lashkar-e-Taiba. In part this is because the group enjoys popular backing in Pakistan's religion-drenched society.

Nor can radical Hinduism—such as it is—claim anything approaching the ambition or ideological rigor of radical Islam. From Morocco to Mindanao, radical Islamists are motivated by the desire to replace man's law with God's law by ordering every aspect of society and the state by the medieval dictates of Shariah law. In ideologues such as the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb (1906-66) and the Pakistani Abul Ala Maududi (1903-79), they find religious justification for terrorism. In Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini, they see the possibility of making their dream a reality. In the oil rich kingdoms of the Middle East, they find deep pockets to tap. None of these is true of Hindu groups. The nature of Hindu society—diffuse, lacking a binding tradition and largely comfortable with modernity—makes the emergence of a Hindu equivalent of the Lashkar-e-Taiba difficult to imagine.

In the end, Mr. Gandhi deserves to be criticized not merely because he's wrong, but because his apparent naiveté hurts India. His comment to Mr. Roemer directly undercut one of New Delhi's main foreign policy objectives—to get the international community to take the threat from Pakistan-based terrorist groups more seriously. More broadly, Mr. Gandhi and his party encourage precisely the kind of conspiratorial mindset and culture of grievance among a section of Indian Muslims that they ought to be working to end.

Finally, they raise the uncomfortable prospect of India being led by a man out of touch with the dominant ethos of the country he seeks to lead, one that may be flawed but remains essentially liberal, humane and resistant to any kind of radicalism. In the long run, it's this ignorance, not a handful of Hindu zealots, that poses the greater threat to India.

Mr. Dhume, a columnist for WSJ.com, is writing a book about the new Indian middle class.

Prof Jagdish Bhagwati on Pankaj Mishra & fiction as non-fiction

25 December 2010
Satyameva Jayati

…the naysayers, among them the socialists in the currently ruling Congress Party, have rejected the ‘miracle’ produced by the reforms by asserting darkly that the growth ‘lacks a human face’, that it is not ‘inclusive’, that the gains have accrued to the rich while the poor have been immiserized, that inequality has increased, and that India stands condemned before the world.

Perhaps the most articulate critics are the ‘progressive’ novelists of India, chief among them Pankaj Mishra whom the op-ed page editors of The New York Times regularly and almost exclusively invite to write about the Indian economy, a privilege they do not seem to extend symmetrically to American novelists to give us their profound thoughts on the US economy!

Mishra’s latest Times op-ed on October 2, 2010, writes of the ‘alarmingly deep and growing inequalities of income and resources in India’, ‘the waves of suicides of tens of thousands of overburdened farmers over the last two decades’, ‘a full-blown insurgency . . . in central India’ to defend tribals against depredations by multinationals, ‘the pitiless exploitations of the new business-minded India’, and much else that is allegedly wrong with India!

While economic analysis can often produce a yawning indifference, and Mishra’s narrative is by contrast eloquent and captivating, the latter is really fiction masquerading as non-fiction.

But are the opponents of the reforms right to complain that the reformers have been focused on growth to the neglect of the underprivileged; and that the latter have been bypassed or immiserized?

It has become fashionable to say that this must be so because the Human Development Index, produced by the UNDP, puts India at the bottom, at 135th rank, in 1994. But this is a nonsensical index which reduces, without scientifically plausible weights, several non-commensurate elements like literacy and health measures to a single number.

It is a fine example of how bad science gains traction because of endless repetition by the media: it must be dismissed as rubbish.

There is no substitute for hard, scientific answers to the questions concerning what has happened, during the period of reforms and enhanced growth, to the poor and the underprivileged: and these answers, as I will presently sketch, are more benign.

After a considerable debate, it is now generally accepted that the enhanced growth over nearly 25 years year was associated with lifting nearly 200 million of the extreme poor above the poverty line. By contrast, consistent with commonsense, the preceding quarter century with abysmal growth rate witnessed no perceptible, beneficial impact on poverty.

Then again, at a narrower level, the political scientist Devesh Kapur and associates have studied the fortune of the Dalits (untouchables) in India’s most populous state, Uttar Pradesh, between 1990 and 2008, to find that 61 per cent of those surveyed in the east and 38 per cent in the west said that their food and clothing situation was ’much better’.

Most striking is the finding of the political scientists Al Stepan and Yogendra Yadav, drawing on polling data produced by the Center for the Study of Developing Societies in Delhi, that for every disadvantaged group including women, the response to the question ’Has your financial situation improved, worsened, or has remained the same’ posed in 1996 and again in 2004, shows that every group has overwhelmingly remained the same or improved: those who claim to have worsened are invariably less than 25 per cent of the respondents.

As for the relative economic outcomes of the disadvantaged groups, the economist Amartya Lahiri and associates have studied India’s ’scheduled castes’ and ’scheduled tribes’, two particularly disadvantaged categories, and conclude that the last twenty years of major reforms ’have seen a sharp improvement in [their] relative economic fortunes’.

Then again, using household expenditure data for 1988 and 2004, the Johns Hopkins economists Pravin Krishna and Guru Sethupathy conclude that inequality, using a well-known measure invented by the Dutch econometrician Henri Theil, while showing initial rise, had fallen by 2004 back to the 1988 levels: a straight rise in inequality cannot be asserted.

I should also add that many reforms help the poor more than the rich because the rich can cope with the results of inefficient policies better than the poor.

If the public sector generation and distribution of electricity is inefficient, and the electricity goes off in the middle of the night in Delhi’s summer, the rich turn on their private generators and their air-conditioners continue working.

But the poor man on his charpoy swelters as his small Usha fan is not working. Those who object to letting in Coke and Pepsi forget that the common man derives his caffeine from these drinks while the well-off critics get theirs from the Espresso and Cappuccino coffee in the cafes.

The most interesting political implication of the success in finally denting poverty significantly, though nowhere enough, is that poverty is now seen by India’s poor and underprivileged to be removable.

India is witness finally to what I have called the Revolution of Perceived Possibilities. Aroused economic aspirations for betterment have led to political demands for the politicians to deliver yet more.

This suggests, as my Columbia University colleague Arvind Panagariya and I have hypothesized, that voters will look to vote for the politicians who can deliver growth, so that we would expect growth before the vote to be correlated with vote now.

In an important paper, Poonam Gupta and Panagariya have recently tested for this hypothesis and indeed found that it works. So, this implies that politicians should be looking to augment reforms, not reverse them as misguided anti- reform critics urge.

So, politicians would do well to strengthen the conventional reforms, which I call Stage 1 reforms, by extending them to the unfinished reform agenda of the early 1990s. In particular, further liberalization of trade in all sectors, substantial freeing up of the retail sector and virtually all labour market reforms are still pending. Such intensification and broadening of Stage 1 reforms can only add to the good that these reforms do for the poor and the underprivileged.

But these conventional reforms have also generated revenues which can finally be spent on targeted health and education so as to additionally improve the well-being of the poor: these are what I call Stage 2 reforms.

When ’progressive’ critics argue that Stage 2 reforms must replace Stage 1 reforms, because they appear superficially to be more pro-poor, they forget that Stage 2 reforms have been made possible only because Stage 1 reforms have been undertaken.

Why have Pakistan and India Evolved so Differently?

by Dr. Moorthy Muthuswamy

(November 01, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) In 1947, unknowingly, a socio-religious experiment was launched: The British-ruled India was partitioned into Pakistan and India for the Muslim minorities and the majority Hindus respectively.

Back then, these two highly illiterate South Asian nations had predominantly agriculture-based economies, with Pakistan inheriting a better-developed irrigation system compared to India.[i] Leaving aside their majority religions, at birth, they shared culture, language, ethnicity and culinary habits. Yet, their evolution couldn’t be any more different – while India has emerged to become a secular nation with a thriving and multi-faceted economy, constitutionally Islamic Pakistan has descended into an economic basket case and a fountainhead of terror.

This analysis offers the possibility of identifying the roots of Pakistan’s gradual evolution since its birth, including the policy decisions taken by the government and the factors influencing them. Such an analysis could form the basis of a more robust policy response to mitigate the threat posed by a nuclear-armed Pakistan. There is yet another reason: it’s due to the realization that Pakistan stands today as a microcosm of the challenges faced by Muslim communities around the globe.

The Pakistani state had the opportunity, like India, to focus on development and wealth creation. But it chose not to. India’s emergence is due to the investments it made in building quality higher educational institutions in the fields of engineering, technology and management in the 1950s and 60s.[ii]

During the same period, while neglecting modern education,[iii] Pakistan was busy sponsoring a myriad of homegrown jihadist groups as a means of extending its sphere of influence abroad. It is suspected of aiding some Taliban groups in order to advance its agenda in Afghanistan.[iv] It is also said to sponsor radical groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, implicated in the 2008 Mumbai attacks by the Indian government.[v]

A narrative of the Muslim minorities in South Asia consists of early hints that are as fascinating as they are telling of Pakistan’s descend into radicalism.

When the British colonizers set up a Sanskrit college in Kolkata in 1829, Hindu leaders opposed it, demanding English medium schools instead. However, when the British announced a program in 1835 to introduce English in schools, Muslim clerics opposed the move by claiming that education imparted in English was at variance with the tenets of Islam.[vi] Hindus clearly understood that acquiring new knowledge required learning English, whereas, Muslim clerics had viewed modern education offered in the English language as abhorrent. These respective outlooks continue to shape these two communities in South Asia even after the birth of Pakistan and India. Back then, the Muslims can hardly be considered a disadvantaged community, having been the ruling class for several centuries, before the advent of the British rule in 1757.[vii]

Before the partition, the founder of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Jinnah outlined a rationale behind a homeland for the Muslims: “So far as I have understood Islam, it does not advocate a democracy which would allow the majority of non-Muslims to decide the fate of the Muslims. We cannot accept a system of government in which the non-Muslims merely by numerical majority would rule and dominate us.”[viii]

A prominent feature of Islam called jihad was invoked in order to carve-out the Muslim majority state of Pakistan. In general, jihad could either mean inner spiritual struggle or an offensive version – a religious war waged to conquer unbelievers and their land.[ix]

Toward establishing the goal of Pakistan, Mr. Jinnah conceived “Direction Action Day” in 1946, which eventually led to uncontrolled rioting and manslaughter.[x] Pamphlets circulated (and read out in mosques) by the Muslim League Party led by Jinnah called for an offensive jihad: “We are starting a jihad in Your [God’s] Name in this very month of Ramzan… enable us to establish the Kingdom of Islam in India and make proper sacrifices for this jihad – by the grace of God may we build up in India the greatest Islamic kingdom in the world."[xi]

Immediately after the birth of Pakistan, another prominent feature of Islam called sharia was invoked to play an overarching role to help govern the new nation. This is in contrast to India where there was separation of church and state due to the consensus belief that no theocratic feature of the majority Hindu religion should likewise play a similar role.

Mr. Jinnah, a westernized and non-practicing Muslim, started his reign with the following promise to the people, including the minorities: “We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State.”[xii] Yet, he too found himself unable to resist sharia, often called an Islamic law. Mr. Jinnah remarked in 1948: “Why this feeling of nervousness that the future constitution of Pakistan is going to be in conflict with Sharia Laws? Islamic principles today are as applicable to life as they were 1,300 years ago… Islam is not only a set of rituals, traditions and spiritual doctrines. Islam is also a code for every Muslim, which regulates his life and conduct, even in politics and economics, and the like.”[xiii] Sharia is an Islamic legal system based upon the teachings of the Muslim holy book, the Koran and the Hadith, sayings and actions of Islam’s founder Muhammad – and it reflects the customs and traditions of Arab tribes of a bygone era.[xiv]

In the subsequent decades religious conservatives successfully pushed to enact increasingly ideological policy measures without encountering much resistance from the civic society. This put Pakistan on an inexorable path to extremism. For instance, in 1949, the Constitutional Assembly of Pakistan passed the “Objectives Resolution” making it clear that Muslims would have higher status than non-Muslims.[xv] With the adaptation of its constitution in 1956, Pakistan called itself an “Islamic Republic.”[xvi]

In 1962, the Pakistani government established Council of Islamic Ideology to ensure that the laws enacted were in conformance with sharia.[xvii] In 1971, as part of putting down an insurrection by disgruntled Muslims in East Pakistan (now called Bangladesh), the West Pakistan-dominated army was issued both verbal and written orders by the military high command to selectively kill the Hindu minorities in East Pakistan in collaboration with jihadist groups.[xviii] This was carried out as part of a pogrom to “cleanse” the region of the “infidel” influence. As a result, millions of Bengalis including possibly a million Hindu minorities were exterminated.[xix]

In 1974, the government, pressured by orthodox Sunni Muslims, passed a bill declaring the more tolerant and inclusive Ahmadiyya Muslim community a non-Muslim minority. Interestingly, unlike the orthodox Sunnis or the Shias, the Ahmadiyyas do not subscribe to the idea of a violent jihad waged on unbelievers.[xx]

A defining metric of where the new nation chose to expend its creative energies and resources is elucidated through the following data. Since its birth in 1947, a total of 106 doctorates in engineering and technology have been awarded in Pakistan, compared to a grand total of 232 doctorates in the field of Islamic studies (out of 2287 total doctorates awarded in social sciences).[xxi] Further breakdown reveals that the majority of the 106 doctorates were awarded since 2005.[xxii] While there has been a major spurt in the number of doctorates awarded since 2000, the focus in PhD production has shifted away from social sciences. For instance, between the years 2005 and 2009 the number of doctorates awarded in engineering and technology shot up from 9 to about 40.[xxiii] However, during the same period, the social sciences saw only a 50 percent increase in the number of doctorates granted.[xxiv]

The above data analysis leads to the following conclusion: until the year 2000 – fifty three years into its birth – Pakistan produced between five to twenty times more doctorates in the single subject of Islamic studies for every doctorate produced in the entire fields of engineering and technology. Evidently, with Islam playing a prominent role in the affairs of the state through sharia and jihad, even mainstream universities took to emphasizing religious scholarship.

By portraying sharia as a “divine” law, the masses are made to depend on regressive Muslim clerics for its interpretation, thereby by giving the clerics unmatched control and authority over Muslim communities. Sharia can be seen to create conditions for the flourishing of jihad in Pakistan, by restricting and over-regulating young Muslims’ lives, and importantly, hampering their ability to create wealth. Offensive jihad then became an all-too-convenient outlet for their pent up energies and desire for adventure.

Whole new independent channels were created to systematically indoctrinate impressionable young minds to develop a passion for jihad (in the context of a religious war) in Pakistan. The social studies curriculum guidelines for grades 6 and 7 instruct textbook writers and teachers to “develop aspiration for jihad.” The government-approved Islamic studies textbook for eighth grade tells students they must be prepared “to sacrifice every precious thing, including life, for jihad.”[xxv] The government even went on to declare that jihad was essential for every Muslim.[xxvi]

Indoctrination extended to the armed forces; “faith, piety and jihad in the path of Allah,” became the motto of the Pakistani army.[xxvii] A required reading of Pakistan’s military officers is an authoritative military manual on jihad called The Quranic Concept of War.[xxviii] It outlines an offensive jihad claimed to be rooted in the religion: “The Quranic military strategy thus enjoins us to prepare ourselves for war to the utmost in order to strike terror into the heart of the enemy, known or hidden... Terror struck into the hearts of the enemy is not only a means; it is the end in itself... Terror is not a means of imposing decision upon the enemy; it is the decision we wish to impose upon him.” A map distributed to the Pakistani military singles out northern India for a transformation into a Muslim-dominated region and its eventual merger with Pakistan by the year 2020.[xxix] Toward achieving this nefarious design, over 800 jihadist cells have been setup within India, presumably with the help of the military-dominated Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence.[xxx]

Sharia is popular with the Pakistani public. A poll conducted by World Public Opinion during the period 2006-2007 even in the relatively cosmopolitan urban areas of Pakistan found seventy nine percent of the respondents agree with seeking to “require Islamic countries to impose a strict application of sharia.”[xxxi] Evidently, the perception of Islam as an all-encompassing “guide to life,” shaped by sharia and preached through Muslim religious institutions was the likely culprit behind Pakistan’s less than whole-hearted embrace of modern education. Indeed, this very outlook too may have discouraged Pakistan from setting up a modern and equitable tax revenue stream. With the affluent and elite hardly paying any taxes, the cash starved Pakistani treasury has to rely on foreign assistance.[xxxii]

An intriguing question is why sharia and violent jihad have dictated the evolution of Muslim-majority Pakistan. A plausible explanation could be because sharia[xxxiii] and jihad[xxxiv] are among the prominent or standout features of Islam’s foundational texts – the Koran, the Hadith and Sira (Muhammad’s biography). And in particular because violent jihad waged on unbelievers has been shown to statistically dominate the non-violent inner struggle jihad in the texts.[xxxv] If these are indeed true, not just in Muslim-majority Pakistan, even if all manner of opportunities for development are available, there should exist compelling evidence of sharia and jihad stunting development and fostering extremism in minority Muslim communities. A window into this perspective comes from the developed western nation of Britain where Muslims of Pakistani origin form the dominant ethnic component in a sizeable Muslim minority population.

The first generation of Muslims from Pakistan and Hindus from India immigrated to Britain during the post war era to find employment in textile mills and in other blue-collar professions. Yet almost fifty to sixty years later, Hindus there have income and education levels comparable to those of the native majority whites. Muslims of Pakistani origin have exactly the opposite record; they tend to be poorer, less educated, and tend to have high crime rates.[xxxvi] In fact, the Muslim population (of which Muslims of Pakistani origin constitute about thirty five percent) in British prisons is about twenty times that of the Hindus. But the Muslim population in Britain is only three times that of the Hindus – and the British Muslims are three times more likely to be unemployed.[xxxvii]

A survey of young British Muslims between the ages of 16 and 24 found that forty percent of them would prefer to be governed by sharia laws, while the figure among Muslims of age 55 and over, in contrast, was only 17 per cent.[xxxviii] This discrepancy can be readily inferred as due to the increased exposure to jihad and sharia the younger generation was subjected to, thanks to the well-resourced local mosques funded in the 1980s (and onwards) by the oil-rich Middle Eastern Sheikdoms.

One in eight young British Muslims showed admiration for jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda that, "are prepared to fight the West."[xxxix] Three of the four jihadists associated with the 7/7 London bombings were from ethnic Pakistani Muslim communities.[xl] And one in four British Muslims, while not condoning the London bombings, sympathized with the feelings and motives of the perpetrators.[xli]

Religions are defined by ideas and practices. In retrospect, that certain attributes of a religion influence people, communities and even nations should surprise no one.

However, it is indeed worrying that certain prominent features of Islam overwhelm modernism and development opportunities under varying conditions – and lead to radicalization of communities, and eventually in many cases, formation of armed groups with a political agenda.

Yet the conventional wisdom is that Muslim radicalism needs to be tackled politically, augmented by security and economic measures, while doing little to directly address the underlying religious dynamics. Among the proponents of this view is the prominent counter-insurgency expert David Kilcullen. In discussing the insurgencies in Pakistan and elsewhere, Dr. Kilcullen asserts: “Islam is invoked by all sides as a rallying cry, not solely by the insurgents. And in fact the conflict is entirely political: it concerns power in human social structures, not theological disputation.”[xlii]

The fact that Islam should be a rallying cry for all sides in itself is an indication that certain religion-based regressive mindset has taken root across the spectrum – and as a consequence, the conflict is not entirely political, free of religious influence.

Admittedly, Dr. Kilcullen’s insightful observations came from field studies; but they are best described as anecdotal evidence. Besides, in his piece he failed to note that sharia has long repressed Pakistan from developing itself, and the focus on violent jihad didn’t help Pakistan’s relations with non-Muslim nations or its very own non-Muslim citizens. Evidently, in the long run, all of this has led to a nation that has failed to provide a future for its citizens and has immersed itself into conflicts in the name of religion. Behind Pakistan’s evolution lie political decisions that are – as discussed in the previous paragraphs – driven by certain prominent features of Islam. Hence, religion plays a central role in the politics of this conflict, contrary to the assertion of Dr. Kilcullen.

Dr. Kilcullen gives the example of successful counter-terrorism strategies implemented in Iraq as a justification of his delinking of politics from religion. For many decades under Saddam Hussein’s secular rule, there was a “separation” of mosque and state. Not wanting to be challenged or dictated by clerics, Mr. Hussein kept a tight leash on Islamic institutions, by curtailing political sermons and community mobilizations led by the mosque. This ensured that sharia was relegated to the backburner.[xliii] However, Mr. Hussein’s deposal in 2003 due to the American military intervention created a power vacuum that was readily filled by the mosque. Still, decades of Mr. Hussein’s secular rule left the Iraqis unprepared for the sharia-based edicts of the clerics.[xliv] The resulting erosion of the newfound clerical support base, and the radicals supported by them, arguably, were among the primary reasons for the success of the America-led “surge” in 2007. In other words, unlike Pakistan, due to its unique history, delinking of politics from religion was an exception in Iraq, rather than the rule – a nuance missing from Dr. Kilcullen’s narrative.

This political-centric view probably led to proposing what may be called “development first” (long-term) strategy toward addressing the jihadist threat. This strategy presumes that by helping to build modern institutions of governance and education (in order to create wealth and opportunities), improve infrastructure and create employment in nations such as Pakistan, an increasingly influential and assertive civic society can be created that would in turn roll back the radicalization of the society. This is the basis of the Kerry-Lugar legislation – a $7.5 billion, 5-year American non-military developmental package for Pakistan.[xlv]

However, the plan associated with the legislation lacks specific religion-centric measures to soften the influence of sharia and jihad on Pakistan. As the previous paragraphs make it clear, the plan in the present form ends up dealing with the symptoms of Pakistan’s shortcomings while overlooking the root causes. This approach is not only destined for failure but is bound to backfire.

Right from its birth, Pakistan chose to ignore opportunities for development, and went on to embark on a sharia-jihad buildup. One wonders, with the fervor for sharia and jihad still remaining high in Pakistan, what has changed? Indeed, the nation’s religiosity appears to have only increased in the subsequent decades. Hence, increasing the standard of living of Pakistanis under the present circumstances is to facilitate furthering the present trend, as paraphrased in the summary of an expansive survey carried out recently: “better economic conditions may be associated with greater support for Islamist militancy.”[xlvi]

Under the present levels of religiosity in Pakistan, externally funded efforts to improve its education system could mean producing more capable new generation of jihadists. For instance, the extremist outfit Lashkar-e-Taiba has recruited more educated youths, some of whom even hold advanced degrees, in the recent years.[xlvii] The other concern is the diversion of funds to wage jihad on Pakistan’s neighbors and to the programs aimed at developing new generation of nuclear weapons.[xlviii]

In conclusion, a study of Pakistan and its Diaspora in Britain, and Pakistan’s contrasting evolution with India suggests the need for paradigm shift in addressing the threat of radical Islam (long-term) – that of a strategy shift from “development first” to “undercutting the influence of sharia and jihad first."

(Dr. Moorthy Muthuswamy is a U.S.-based nuclear physicist and author of the recent book Defeating Political Islam: The New Cold War. His email: moorthym@comcast.net)

References:

[i]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Punjab,_Pakistan.

[ii]http://education.nic.in/sector.asp#milestoneFrom.

[iii]http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006%5C11%5C19%5Cstory_19-11-2006_pg13_1.

[iv]http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/multimedia/20106138531279734lse-isi-taliban.pdf.

[v]http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/18/pakistan-isi-mumbai-terror-attacks.

[vi]http://www.dailypioneer.com/131270/Islamists-block-social-reform.html.

[vii]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Raj.

[viii]http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_28-11-2004_pg3_2.

[ix]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jihad.

[x]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_Action_Day.

[xi]http://www.islam-watch.org/MA_Khan/Talibanization-of-Pakistan-Realizing-Dreams-of-Founding-Fathers.htm.

[xii]http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/constituent_address_11aug1947.html.

[xiii]http://forum.urduworld.com/f2802/jinnah-after-august-11-1947-%3B-aakar-patel-220308/.

[xiv]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sharia.

[xv]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Objectives_Resolution.

[xvi]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pakistan.

[xvii]http://www.cii.gov.pk/index.asp.

[xviii]http://www.bangla2000.com/bangladesh/Independence-War/Report-Hamoodur-Rahman/default.shtm.

[xix]http://www.genocidebangladesh.org/.

[xx]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmadiyya.

[xxi]http://www.hec.gov.pk/hecdata/Pages/default.aspx; Specific data on the number of doctorates awarded in the field of Islamic studies was acquired by contacting Higher Education Commission, Pakistan.

[xxii]http://www.hec.gov.pk/InsideHEC/Divisions/QALI/Others/Statistics/Pages/PhdDisciplinewise2.aspx.

[xxiii]Ibid.

[xxiv]Ibid.

[xxv]http://articles.latimes.com/2005/aug/18/world/fg-schools18.

[xxvi]Pervez Hoodbhoy, “The Saudi-isation of Pakistan,” Newsline.com, January 2009,

http://www.newsline.com.pk/NewsJan2009/cover2jan2009.htm.

[xxvii]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_military_unit_mottoes_by_country.

[xxviii]http://www.scribd.com/doc/20467531/Malik-Quranic-Concept-of-War-Original.

[xxix]http://sify.com/news/isi-plans-islamic-republic-of-pakistan-by-2020-in-india-news-national-jegu13cebda.html.

[xxx]http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/aug/12terror.htm.

[xxxi]http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/346.php.

[xxxii]http://www.newsdaily.com/stories/tre69e3zx-us-pakistan-tax/.

[xxxiii]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sharia.

[xxxiv]http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=297.

[xxxv]Ibid.

[xxxvi]http://www.jrf.org.uk/sites/files/jrf/2010.pdf.

[xxxvii]http://www.britishcouncil.org/spain-society-british-muslims-media-guide.pdf.

[xxxviii]http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1540895/Young-British-Muslims-getting-more-radical.html.

[xxxix]Ibid.

[xl]http://www.telegraphindia.com/1060512/asp/foreign/story_6214208.asp.

[xli]http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1494648/One-in-four-Muslims-sympathises-with-motives-of-terrorists.html.

[xlii]http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/05/print/religion-and-insurgency/.

[xliii]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saddam_Hussein.

[xliv]http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/27/world/middleeast/27mahdi.html.

[xlv]http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-962.

[xlvi]Jacob N. Shapiro and C. Christine Fair, "Why Support Islamist Militancy? Evidence from Pakistan," International Security, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Winter 2009/2010).

[xlvii]http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/dec/25/lashkar-e-taiba-draws-well-educated-youths/.

[xlviii]http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/18/world/asia/18nuke.html.

WikiWrecks: 26/11 And US Intent

By M Shamsur Rabb Khan
Eurasiareview (article since removed but available at google cache)

The David Headley saga put a big question mark over the US policy for tackling terror due to the inability of the FBI to inform their Indian counterparts about 26/11. New Delhi learnt the big lesson that it had to deal with Pakistan-sponsored terrorists on its own, while the rhetoric from Washington was only a diplomatic red herring. Now the Wikileaks disclosure is another setback for Indo-US relations. According to a leaked cable, the US suppressed information related to the involvement of the ISI in the Mumbai attacks, but also defended it. They vindicate India’s firm stand that the ISI was behind the Mumbai terror attack, but paint the US government in very poor light, especially its intention to proceed seriously in the war on terror.

The relevant cable from the US embassy in Pakistan to the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, in January 2009 says, “We are concerned that India's premature public dissemination of this information will undermine essential law enforcement efforts and forestall further Indo-Pakistan cooperation. Our goal is not only to bring the perpetrators of this attack to justice, but also to begin a dialogue that will reduce tensions between India and Pakistan.” The use of phrases like “premature public dissemination” and “forestall further Indo-Pakistan cooperation” are objectionable since New Delhi has every right to pursue and bring to justice those who are behind these ghastly attacks. In view of the dubious role played by David Headley, it is undeniable that the US was also a major player in 26/11.

This is not all. On the issue of investigations into the Mumbai attacks, the US Embassy described the “Million Dollar Question” as the role played by the ISI. The US also tried to protect ISI chief Ahmed Shuja Pasha from the investigations into 26/11 by India even though the findings clearly indicated the ISI’s involvement as led by him. In its further double-standard policy to save Pasha, the cable from the US embassy in Islamabad revealed that the US was keen on urging India to delay the release of their findings since they could undermine Pasha. Washington thus showed little concern for the victims of 26/11 and their families.

In this confidential exchange of diplomatic messages, the US is clearly seen to be supporting the Pakistan Army and not the democratically elected President, Asif Ali Zardari, who was ready to send the ISI chief to New Delhi after the attacks. However, the Pakistani army led by General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the cable said, overruled Zardari. And it seems the US, in turn, played a major role in influencing the decision of the Pakistan Army. It is high time the Government of India readjusts its policies in view of the differentiated American perceptions of the war on terror: the US considers 9/11 to be its watershed, but has shown indifference to India’s 26/11. For New Delhi, the US is a party to the delay that Pakistan maintains in prosecuting the perpetrators of 26/11.

Another WikiLeaks cable which will act as an impediment to close ties with the US reveals American perceptions about the Indian Army and its war preparedness. In a cable dated 16 February 2010, the US Ambassador to India, Tim Roemer, described the “Cold Start Doctrine” as a mixture of myth and reality. Roemer says, “It's never been and may never be put to use on a battlefield because of substantial and serious resource constraints.” For Roemer, the Indian Army is “slow and lumbering, and unable to attack with an element of surprise.”

New Delhi has placed too much reliance on support from the US regarding its crucial security concerns, including fighting the terror infrastructure across the border. Washington’s apprehension about escalating tensions between India and Pakistan has not yielded any worthwhile results either in restraining Pakistan from exporting terror or appreciating India’s forbearance in not snapping diplomatic ties. Given the US interest in tackling the Mumbai terror attacks, it is imperative for New Delhi to reveal its seriousness in single-handedly pursuing the perpetrators of 26/11 without much consideration for US concerns. Only then would India, as a sovereign state, restore the faith of its people in its strength and ability to take decisive action.
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WikiWrecks: Did The US Double-Cross India?
Monday, 13 December 2010 13:10
At Eurasiareview since removed (google cache)

By Radhavinod Raju

Indian media reactions to the WikiLeaks’ disclosures pertaining to the 26/11 attacks were, to say the least, unfair. One headline read, ‘US backstabbed India after 26/11?’ It is now known that the US agencies had shared intelligence that revealed there were threats of a sea-borne attack, that the Taj Hotel was a target, and places frequented by foreigners, especially Americans and Israelis, were vulnerable to attacks. It is not yet clear whether David Coleman Headley alias Daood Gilani, the US citizen of Pakistani origin who collaborated with the Lashkar-e-Taiba in the Mumbai attacks, was under the surveillance of US agencies from before the attack, and whether they were aware of his role in the planning of the attack. There is no evidence thus far to suggest such a possibility.



The leaked cables indicated that the US Ambassador to Pakistan was concerned about premature public dissemination of information by India that would undermine essential law enforcement efforts and forestall further Indo-Pakistan cooperation. The input further stated that their goal was not only to bring the perpetrators of this attack to justice, but also to begin a dialogue that would reduce tensions between India and Pakistan. Related cables show that the ISI chief had agreed to share information about the progress of their investigation with India, and that premature dissemination of this information in the Indian media would have reflected badly on him in the Pakistani media which would have been a setback. According to the cable, it was necessary to keep channels of communication open in order to prevent future attacks.

These cables were from the US Ambassador to Pakistan to her Government. There appears to be nothing wrong with this assessment. The US Ambassador to Pakistan was in touch with Pakistani officials and was communicating their fears and her own assessment of these fears to her Government. How would this be backstabbing India?

The other important cable was that no amount of money to Pakistan would prevent the Pakistan Army from supporting terrorist groups that were attacking India. This is an assessment that would more or less agree with the assessment of the Indian security establishment, who would never lower their guard against terrorist attacks emanating from Pakistani soil. For them, their experiences over the past 60 years were too harsh to have any other contra view.

Published material, including Bob Woodward’s Obama’s Wars, would show that the Pakistanis had told the US that rogue elements in the ISI could be involved in the Mumbai attacks. However, published material of David Headley’s interrogation would indicate that Headley was funded by a serving ISI Major, Iqbal, for going to Mumbai in preparation for the attack. The Pakistanis have reportedly said that Headley’s statement during his interrogation would be treated as hearsay by Pakistan’s courts. This is a technical issue and there could be a way to work around this. The question is whether the Pakistanis, or to be more specific, the Pakistan Army, would cooperate in this effort. Major Iqbal is just a name, and could be one of the aliases that the ISI Major was using. He cannot be identified without the full cooperation of the Pakistan Army. There is little possibility of this ever happening.

We just have to recall a few incidents that would point out who calls the shots in Pakistan. Soon after the Zardari-led Government came to power in Islamabad, they issued an order to bring the ISI under the control of the Interior Ministry. This order was recalled post-haste after the Army Chief objected. The Pakistan Foreign Minister, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, was actually in India when the Mumbai attack took place. If he had the slightest inkling that an attack was to take place, would he have been in India? Zardari offered to send the ISI chief, Shuja Pasha to India in the aftermath of the Mumbai attack. He was forced to wriggle out of this public commitment after the strong objection expressed by the Army Chief.

What we need to have is unassailable evidence that a serving Major of the ISI was a key element of the attack, and that the other important player, the retired Major Pasha, was working closely with the ISI in the LeT’s plan to attack India. As of now we lack evidence that could withstand judicial scrutiny, though the information is quite solid. The Pakistan Army is simply not ready for peace. Its instrument, the ISI, would continue to target India’s economic and security centres to bring pressure on India through non-state actors to yield on Kashmir. After Kashmir, they will invent some other root cause to extend the conflict. We have to be prepared for the next attack. The Wiki cables do give a hint of this. For that we should be grateful for the leaks, for it agrees with our own assessment.


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10NEWDELHI367: FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER DISCUSSES HEADLEY CASE
Search for "Headley" at CableSearch.org

Is Pakistan Losing Patience in the War on Terror?

Time
Monday, Dec. 20, 2010

By ROBERT BAER

On Saturday, in answer to a New York Times article, Pakistan's secretive spy agency denied that it had exposed the identity of a senior CIA official in Pakistan, causing him to abruptly leave Pakistan. In a briefing held on background, an official of the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) couldn't have made it more categorical: "We absolutely deny this accusation, which is totally unsubstantiated and based on conjecture."

Short of a smoking gun, we'll have to take the Pakistanis' word for it. CIA cover is never perfect, and this wouldn't be the first time that a CIA officer has been forced to leave his post in the middle of the night.

But what can't be dismissed is the suit filed by a Pakistani tribesman in which he accuses the CIA of murdering his brother and his son in a drone attack. According to press reports, none of which have been confirmed by the CIA, it was the appearance of the station chief's name in a filing in this suit, along with unspecified threats, that caused him to be pulled. Regardless, the suit itself could be an ominous sign that the Pakistanis may be coming to the end of their rope in the "war on terror."

Here's why: I have long known that the ISI oversees the judiciary, from the appointment of judges to interfering in cases that harm national security. There are no exceptions. If there were a Julian Assange, the WikiLeaks founder, he'd be behind bars — for life. In other words, it's all but certain that the ISI greenlit the case brought by the tribesman for the death of his brother and son.

The ISI's power in the judiciary hit home for me two years ago. My wife and I were winding our way through the Pakistani court system as part of an adoption. I wondered right from the beginning how often ex-CIA agents had appeared before Pakistan's notoriously conservative judiciary - and what the government would think about us, or if it might even block the adoption. Every lawyer I talked to assured me that the government - the ISI - wouldn't care about a civil case. When I asked whether the ISI intervened in cases touching national security, they only smiled.

In trying to figure out what's happening in Pakistan these days let's not fool ourselves. The ISI is not a rogue agency that does exactly what it wants. It falls squarely under Pakistan's military. The commander and chief controls the budget as well as personnel appointments. At any time, he can remove the ISI's director. And since Pakistan's military is the ultimate executive authority in the country, it would be safe to conclude Pakistan itself permitted the suit against the CIA.

Conceding that I've climbed out on a long speculative limb — but who doesn't when it comes to Pakistan? — we should be wondering just how much purchase we've lost in Pakistan. They want our money, but not our drones. They don't want the United States to fall into the arms of India, but they also do not intend to kowtow to us. They want to be a part of any settlement in Afghanistan, but they won't or can't bring the Taliban under control. But now, with leading elements of the country possibly going after the CIA, whether it's by leaking a name or by fighting it in the courts, we should start wondering whether Pakistan is done with the bargaining on the war on terror.

Baer, a former Middle East CIA field officer, is TIME.com's intelligence columnist and the author of See No Evil and, most recently, The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower
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Note: The CIA quickly withdrew its Islamabad station chief from Pakistan on Friday after his identity was revealed in a lawsuit that alleges U.S. responsibility for the wrongful death of civilians as part of its drone operations in the FATA. The station chief had reportedly received death threats from terrorist groups as a result of the lawsuit. The lawyer representing the lawsuit, Shahzad Akbar, said he had received the station chief’s name from local journalists. On Saturday, a spokesman for Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) denied accusations made by U.S. officials that the ISI had intentionally exposed the name of the CIA station chief in retaliation for U.S. lawsuits filed last month which named ISI chief Lieutenant General Ahmed Shuja Pasha in connection with the 2008 terror attacks in Mumbai.

_________________________________________


Daily Times
Monday, December 20, 2010
EDITORIAL: An unfriendly act

Pakistan is in the midst of yet another controversy. Jonathan Banks, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) chief in Pakistan, had to flee the country last week after reportedly receiving serious threats to his life. An application against the CIA chief was submitted by a resident of North Waziristan, Karim Khan, to the Secretariat Police Station in Islamabad whereby Mr Khan has alleged that his son and brother were killed in a drone strike and since Mr Banks oversees the drone attacks, he should be held responsible for their deaths. It is now being reported that because of the police’s hesitation to take action against Mr Banks, he was able to leave the country. What remains a mystery though is who could have leaked the name of the CIA chief to the drone victims’ family. According to the New York Times, “The American officials said they strongly suspected that operatives of Pakistan’s powerful spy service, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence [ISI], had a hand in revealing the CIA officer’s identity — possibly in retaliation for a civil lawsuit filed in Brooklyn last month implicating the ISI chief [Lieutenant-General Ahmad Shuja Pasha] in the Mumbai terrorist attacks of November 2008.”

Blowing the cover of the CIA chief and his subsequent departure from Pakistan is not a small matter. The Americans will not take it kindly and this would be seen as an unfriendly act by the US’s frontline ally in the war against terror if the ISI did out Mr Banks’ name. Even though the ISI has vehemently denied this allegation by calling it “a slur” that “can create differences between the two organisations [the ISI and CIA]”, it is not unnatural that the finger of suspicion is pointing towards Pakistan’s top spy agency. Mr Banks was reportedly here on a business visa, meaning thereby that he was operating undercover. To find out his identity is no mean task and could not have been done without the help of our intelligence agencies, who are the only ones to have access to such sensitive information. If indeed the ISI exposed the CIA chief in retaliation for the lawsuit filed against the ISI chief in the US, it could have grave repercussions for our country. Complaints against the ISI have been lodged in Pakistani courts over the years yet that has never bothered the spy agency before. It is unclear what prompted the ISI to indulge in this seemingly tit-for-tat move against the Americans. The US is not very happy with Pakistan’s double game vis-à-vis the Taliban in the first place; outing the CIA chief under such circumstances is akin to provocation of a serious nature. There is already immense pressure on Pakistan to launch a military offensive in North Waziristan to take out the Taliban safe havens. Drone attacks have also increased in recent months and the message from the US is loud and clear: if you are not willing to take action against the Taliban, we will.

After the CIA chief debacle, the US might be forced to take some even more drastic action. Given our military establishment’s track record, the possibility of the ISI’s role in this incident cannot be overlooked. If this is true, did the ISI not realise the implications of angering the Americans to an extent that could lead to a stand-off between the superpower and Pakistan? If the ISI is indeed responsible for blowing Mr Banks’ cover, we could be in for a lot of trouble in coming days.
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December 17, 2010
New York Times

Pakistani Role Is Suspected in Revealing U.S. Spy’s Name

By MARK MAZZETTI and SALMAN MASOOD

WASHINGTON — The Central Intelligence Agency’s top clandestine officer in Pakistan’s capital, Islamabad, was removed from the country on Thursday amid an escalating war of recriminations between American and Pakistani spies, with some American officials convinced that the officer’s cover was deliberately blown by Pakistan’s military intelligence agency.

The American spy’s hurried departure is the latest evidence of mounting tensions between two uneasy allies, with the Obama administration’s strategy for ending the war in Afghanistan hinging on the cooperation of Pakistan in the hunt for militants in the mountains that border those two countries. The tensions could intensify in the coming months with the prospect of more American pressure on Pakistan.

As the cloak-and-dagger drama was playing out in Islamabad, 100 miles to the west the C.I.A. was expanding its covert war using armed drones against militants. Since Thursday, C.I.A. missile strikes have killed dozens of suspects in Khyber Agency, a part of the tribal areas in Pakistan that the spy agency had largely spared until now because of its proximity to the sprawling market city of Peshawar.

American officials said the C.I.A. station chief had received a number of death threats since being publicly identified in a legal complaint sent to the Pakistani police this week by the family of victims of earlier drone campaigns.

The American officials said they strongly suspected that operatives of Pakistan’s powerful spy service, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, had a hand in revealing the C.I.A. officer’s identity — possibly in retaliation for a civil lawsuit filed in Brooklyn last month implicating the ISI chief in the Mumbai terrorist attacks of November 2008.

The officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, did not immediately provide details to support their suspicions.

The mistrust between the C.I.A. and ISI, two uneasy but co-dependent allies, could hardly come at a worse time. The Obama administration’s Afghan war strategy depends on greater cooperation from Pakistan to hunt militants in the country’s western mountains, and yet if Pakistan considers Washington’s demands excessive, it could order an end to the C.I.A. drone campaign.

“We will continue to help strengthen Pakistani capacity to root out terrorists,” President Obama said Thursday in a briefing on the war strategy. “Nevertheless, progress has not come fast enough. So we will continue to insist to Pakistani leaders that terrorist safe havens within their borders must be dealt with.”

The job of the C.I.A. station chief in Islamabad is perhaps the spy agency’s most important overseas post, one that requires helping oversee the agency’s covert war and massaging its often testy relationship with the ISI.

That relationship has often frayed in recent years. American officials believe that ISI officers helped plan the deadly July 2008 bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, as well as provided support to Lashkar-e-Taiba militants who carried out the Mumbai attacks later that year.

Michael J. Morell, the C.I.A.’s deputy director, met Thursday with Pakistani officials in Islamabad, but American officials said his visit was not the result of the station chief’s case.

The lawsuit filed in Brooklyn last month, brought by families of American victims of the Mumbai attacks, names the ISI chief, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, as being complicit in the attacks. The suit asserts that General Pasha and other ISI officers were “purposefully engaged in the direct provision of material support or resources” to the planners of the Mumbai attacks.

A senior Pakistani official, also speaking on the condition of anonymity, said that the Pakistani government “believes that the suit in New York does not have a sound legal basis, and is based on conjecture.”

“We did not need to retaliate,” he said. “As far as the government of Pakistan and the ISI are concerned, we look forward to working with the Americans in securing the world from transnational threats, especially the shared threat of terrorism.”

The legal complaint in Pakistan that identified the station chief was filed Monday over drone attacks that killed at least four Pakistanis. The complaint sought police help in keeping the station chief in the country until a lawsuit could be filed. The C.I.A.’s decision to remove the station chief from Islamabad was first reported Friday morning by The Associated Press.

The C.I.A. officer’s name was revealed last month in a news conference by Mirza Shahzad Akbar, the lawyer who filed the complaint this week.

Soon afterward, the name began appearing on a number of Pakistani Web sites generally believed to have a close association with the ISI. One Web site mentioned the C.I.A. officer on Dec. 14 and asked readers to track down pictures of him.

The New York Times generally does not identify American intelligence operatives working undercover.

Mr. Akbar, the lawyer who brought the case against the C.I.A., said it would continue despite the station chief’s absence. He is representing Kareem Khan, a resident of North Waziristan who said that his son and brother were killed in a drone strike.

A vast majority of C.I.A. drone strikes in the tribal areas have occurred in North Waziristan. Mr. Khan is seeking $500 million in compensation, and accusing the C.I.A. officer of running a clandestine spying operation out of the United States Embassy in Islamabad.

“My brother and son were innocent,” Mr. Khan said in a recent interview. “There were no Taliban hiding in my house.”

Western and Pakistani intelligence officials said, however, that the drone attack also killed Haji Omer, a senior commander allied with the Haqqani militant network and Al Qaeda.

Mr. Akbar said that he did not believe that the station chief had been removed from Islamabad for his security. “Obviously, his name had come out in the open, and maybe he feared police action or an action by the Supreme Court,” Mr. Akbar said in an interview.

American officials disagreed. The threats to the station chief “were of such a serious nature that it would be imprudent not to act,” according to a United States intelligence official who spoke on the condition of anonymity.

George Little, a C.I.A. spokesman, would not confirm that the station chief had to leave Pakistan, but did say that “station chiefs routinely encounter major risk as they work to keep America safe,” and that “their security is obviously a top priority for the C.I.A., especially when there’s an imminent threat.”

Meanwhile, the C.I.A. has continued to pummel parts of the tribal areas with missiles. On Thursday, a C.I.A. drone launched a strike in the Tirah Valley of the Khyber Agency, where Pakistani militants are believed to have fled to escape military operations in other parts of the tribal belt. Three more strikes followed on Friday, a Pakistani government official said, killing dozens of militant suspects.

Attacks in Khyber are uncommon. Pakistani officials have tried to dissuade the Americans from attacking Khyber and Mohmand Agency, fearing that strikes in those areas could fuel violence in Peshawar. The Khyber Agency is home to Lashkar-e-Islami, a militant organization sometimes allied with the Pakistani Taliban.

Discussing the conclusions of the latest review of the Afghan war strategy, Obama administration officials said this week that the United States would be more aggressive in going after militants in the tribal areas — with or without Pakistan’s help.